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POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY  1
The evolution of socio-economic systems is non-linear, it includes both the periods of smooth changes 
and subsequent abrupt transformational leaps. The overall structure of new prospects opens as early as at 
the stage of emerging evolutionary processes, and their forecast requires to analyze the historical premises 
and risks that are closely associated with the change of public attitudes. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the newly independent states went through a transformational and evolutionary development stage that led 
them from a regional economy (since they actually had been the regions) to the national economy, while the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe experienced a dramatic drift towards the European Union. This 
paper examines the results of almost 25-year-long transformation of these countries. The new states that 
emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union went through three types of transformation. First, there 
were transformations on the ideological level. The transformations of the second type were purely economic. 
The third type can be described as institutional (including structural and financial) transformation. It has 
been demonstrated that one of the important reasons for modest economic performance in the post-Soviet 
space was the fact that the new states ignored and did not use the principles of regional policy and regional 
modernization in their state-building practice. A characteristic feature in the socio-economic evolution of 
Eastern Europe after 1990 was a sharply emphasized process of stratification and social differentiation 
occurring against the backdrop of insufficiently strong middle class and the polarization of income levels 
in different regions. The growing polarization of income levels in different regions represents the dominant 
trend of rising economic inequality. 
Keywords: regional development, economic inequality, integrated modernization, economic transformation, new states, 
clustering, institutional reforms, social differentiation, middle class 
Introduction
The slowdown in the pace of growth of living standards in the CIS that began in 2013–2014 can 
be interpreted as resulting from combination of some extremely unfavorable circumstances, such 
as sanctions of 2014 and the ensuing currency crisis in Russia, extreme instability of the Ukrainian 
economy, transition to economic austerity in the hydrocarbon-rich Kazakhstan. However, such 
assessment would be superficial.
All studies on the economic evolution of post-Soviet space can be divided into three groups. 
The first group includes the papers on the transition from a communist economy to capitalism 
that are based on a hypothesis that the optimal solution was to implement the European path of 
development in the post-Soviet space [1–5].
The second group of studies [6–9] examines the evolution of the post-Soviet space in a 
comprehensive way taking into account both the transition period and subsequent integration within 
the Eurasian space. 
The third cluster of papers includes the studies on the prospects of economic integration in the 
Eurasian space [10–18].
Among all the above-mentioned papers, we did virtually not find any systemic studies analyzing 
the factor of regional modernization as one of the key elements for modernization at the national 
level. At the same time, we should mention a number of papers in which the regional development 
issues have been analyzed in a comprehensive way. First of all, these include studies conducted at the 
Institute of Economics of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences [19–23].
1 Original Russian Text © Akaev A. A., Ichkitidze Yu. R., Sarygulov A. I., Sokolov V. N., 2016, published in Ekonomika regiona 
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As demonstrated by the governance practice in modern Russia, the existence of high-quality 
research results does not guarantee their practical and widespread use. One is compelled to acknowledge 
that the regional aspect of development fell off the radar for politicians in the post-Soviet space and 
we view this fact as a key cause of many economic failures — the politicians have been absorbed with 
the idea of statehood rather than preoccupied with the development of regions as components of the 
national economy.
Unlike the CIS, Central and Eastern European countries passed the post-communist transformation 
period more quickly, and their socio-economic institutions are much better adapted to Western standards. 
However, the institutional reform alone is not sufficient for successful regional modernization — the 
continued differences in living standards between the countries and regions put constrains on the 
growth of the internal market; another negative trend is significantly slowed the pace of urbanization 
amid the decline and sometimes even extinction of cities [24–27].
1. What Changed for the Better in the Post-Soviet Transformation Period?
The experience of transforming the countries of former Soviet Union into a market economy is 
unique. Just over two weeks, 15 independent states emerged instead of one huge Soviet Union; most 
of these states not only had no elaborated strategy and a clear vision of the future, but also faced 
the economic and humanitarian catastrophe and were on the brink of local armed conflicts [1, 28]. 
Amid the reigning chaos and internal uncertainty, Western economists proposed a package of reforms 
(the same for all countries), including privatization of state property, liberalization of prices, financial 
markets and foreign trade, renunciation of previously adopted social obligations as a condition for 
achieving the macroeconomic stability. 
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Fig. 1. Baseline growth rate of GDP in the CIS countries and Georgia in 1991–1998
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The most "easily" passed transformational recession of the 1990s was in Belarus, where the 
maximum decline of GDP was only 35 %, while a sustainable recovery began as early as in 1996 (Fig. 1). 
This was partly related to the preservation of diversified industry and agricultural focus towards the 
Russian market. The most dramatic decline (72 %) was registered in Georgia, which was the result 
of the civil war, conflict in Abkhazia and suicidal break of economic ties with Russia [29]. The deep 
and protracted recessions reaching 60–70 % and lasting up to 7 years were also observed in Ukraine, 
Moldova and Tajikistan.
Compared to countries in Eastern Europe, where the maximum recession was on average 15 %, 
the decline in GDP in the post-Soviet countries was deeper. This was yet another confirmation of 
distinctive differences between the post-Soviet space and the countries of Europe. For example, in 
terms of institutional and legislative components, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were 
much better prepared than the post-Soviet states, as they began to implement the economic reforms 
noticeably earlier than the 1990s [30, 31].
The transformation period was marked by an uneven decline in different industries. Those that 
have been lost (and not restored later) include not only knowledge-intensive production facilities, 
but even the light industry and furniture production. There was a significant decline in the share of 
manufacturing in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. This process also affected Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. By 2014, only Belarus, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan had managed 
to partially rebuild or at least maintain the same share of manufacturing in their GDP.
Hyperinflation was a natural economic effect of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1992–1994, 
the average monthly rate of inflation in Russia was 19.7 %; in Belarus, 25.1 %; in Ukraine, 27.5 %. 
The technical reason for excessive emission of money was the actual competition between the central 
banks of newly independent states in 1992 — first half of 1993. Only with the introduction of national 
currencies amid the expansion of IMF loans, the CIS countries and Georgia began to show in 1995 the 
first signs of financial stabilization. The most important result of hyperinflation in 1992–1995 was the 
increased demand for US dollars. 2
As a result of all this, the West began to view the post-Soviet space as a sales market, source of 
natural resources and territory for expansion of cash dollars. 
The privatization was mainly implemented in the most rapid manner and strictly in the best 
interest of new elite, while the ordinary people became poorer. 3 This process of deception became 
firmly rooted in the minds of people in the new states as a vivid characteristic of capitalism and what 
was brought to them by the "wild" market economy. Therefore, after almost two decades, the slow pace 
of privatization observed in such countries, as Belarus and Turkmenistan, look quite reasonable from 
both a social and purely economic point of view. By 1996, the share of private sector in GDP of these 
countries was 15–25 %, while in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, the figure was 50–60 % (EBRD 
data). In Belarus, the slow and inconsistent privatization reforms were reversed by the outcome of 
the constitutional referendum held in 1996. Currently, the share of private sector in GDP of Belarus 
is about 30 %, which determines the specific character of Belarusian economic model. A similar 
model is implemented in Turkmenistan, where the fuel and energy minerals are extracted by state-
owned concerns "Turkmenneft" and "Turkmengaz" while in other sectors of the economy the share of 
private sector is 65 %. The state monopoly on the fuel and energy sector coupled with the political 
homogeneity, as time has shown, does not prevent Turkmenistan from having the highest (among CIS 
countries) rate of growth in living standards since the crisis of 2008.
Therefore, the results of privatization process in the post-Soviet space show that the CIS and Georgia 
(unlike the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states) were not ready for a civilized 
entry into a market economy in connection with the particular characteristics of their mentality and 
traditions. The overwhelming majority of people objectively had no culture of entrepreneurship and 
reasonable (effective) management of private property. In such circumstances, the reform should have 
been implemented gradually, with a focus on pinpointed large-scale privatization to strategic investors 
in exchange for real investments. But this did not happen in this way, and today we have what we have. 
The accelerated privatization only aggravated the collapse of knowledge-intensive industrial sectors 
2 According to various estimates, in 1992–1996, 250–300 billion dollars in cash were overall imported to the countries in the post-
Soviet space.
3 This is evidenced by more than twofold increase in the Gini index for 1990–1999 in most post-Soviet states (except Belarus and 
Kazakhstan).
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and general economic downturn. It is hard to disagree with the assessment made by some Russian 
economists: "The post-Soviet states still lag far behind the developed world. The most successful of 
them are just at the worldwide average level of development. This is the result of an unprecedented 
de-industrialization resulting from the market transformation and collapse of the Soviet Union" [32, 
p. 54].
By the end of 1990, the structural changes associated with the transition from a planned to a market 
economy had been mostly completed. The gap in living standards between developed and developing 
countries, which had emerged by that time, created the conditions for expansion and movement of 
individual industries from the developed countries to the periphery. The global aggregate demand 
began to expand as a result of higher income among the significant part of the population in the 
fastest growing economies (mainly China and India). This led to increase in prices for energy and 
metals and, in particular, contributed to the accelerated growth in the economies in those post-Soviet 
states that were rapidly developing the mining sectors and metallurgy. This allowed to achieve average 
annual economic growth rate of 7.2 % in 1999–2008, but the highest average annual growth rates 
were recorded in Azerbaijan (16.3 %), Armenia (11.4 %), Kazakhstan (9.4 %), while the lowest were in 
Moldova (5.9 %) and Kyrgyzstan (4.9 %).
In general, the results of economic evolution in the post-Soviet space during 1990–2014 allow to 
clearly cluster the countries into four groups. The first group includes the countries, where the economic 
development was focused on integration with Russia. These are the current members of the Eurasian 
Economic Union, including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. The second group 
includes the countries that are outside EEU but showed a significant increase in the average standard of 
living following the rapid development of oil and gas sectors (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan). The third 
group of countries includes Ukraine and Georgia, which both had a fairly high standard of living in the 
Soviet times but could not improve it in the period of post-communist transformation. It is interesting 
to note that both countries are engaged in the accelerated dialog with NATO, and this reflects their 
predominantly Euro-Atlantic direction of economic integration. Finally, the fourth group (Uzbekistan, 
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Fig. 2. The structure of evolution of the post-Soviet space
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Tajikistan and Moldova) includes the countries with the lowest average standard of living. In terms 
of economic development, Moldova is closer to Ukraine and Georgia. Uzbekistan made and continues 
to make a significant leap forward both in terms of its demographics and economic development. 
The large domestic market enhances these processes and allows it to claim in the future the role of a 
regional leader. After a devastating civil war, Tajikistan finally has embarked on the path of sustainable 
development, and we can expect that, in the next decade, the standard of living that existed in 1990 
will be restored.
More broadly (Fig. 2), we can acknowledge that the new states formed after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union went through three types of transformation. First, there were transformations on the 
ideological level. The transformations of the second type were purely economic. The third type can be 
described as institutional (including structural and financial) transformation.
2. Regional Development and Economic Inequality
When studying the issue of economic equality of regions in low-income countries with catch-up 
development model, J. Williamson put forward the hypothesis that the typical pattern of national 
development can be presented in the form of inverted U-shaped curve, when the early stages of 
development create interregional disparities, that are then leveled and various regions draw nearer each 
other in terms of development at the later stages. He came to this conclusion based on the arguments 
of Myrdal and Hirschman that interregional ties, movements of production factors and the policy of 
the central government are selective in favor of the development centers in the early stages, while the 
higher level of income at the national level, in the later stages of development, allows to ensure the 
reversal of this trend. In high-income countries, the goals of ensuring the growth at the national level 
and economic convergence of regions are not in conflict [33].
The collapse of the socialist system and the emergence of New Europe at the turn of the 20th 
and 21st centuries provided extensive empirical data to test this hypothesis. The enlargement of the 
European Union required considerable financing not only to adapt the legislative and institutional 
framework in new countries, but also to allocate significant funds for structural, sectoral and regional 
reforms. To eliminate the distortions in various regions and ensure a smoother entry of ten countries 
(Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania) 
into the European Union, a program aimed at restructuring their economies (PHARE program) was 
adopted in the early 1990s. The regional development was ensured by the financing, provided primarily 
through infrastructure projects by the European Investment Bank. Overall, in 1991–1995, the amount 
of provided loans reached 3.45 billion ECU and the grants provided under PHARE reached 5.42 billion 
ECU; an additional amount of 6.69 billion ECU was provided in 1995–1999 [34]. Later, the volumes of 
financing were only increasing (Table 1).
Table 1
The volumes of financing provided by EU to 10 countries for structural, sectoral and regional reforms (billion euros)*
Country
Years 
2004–2006 2007–2013 2014–2020
Czech Republic 3.45 26.3 21.6
Estonia 0.85 3.4 5.9
Hungary 4.34 26.5 21.49
Latvia 1.43 4.5 4.42
Lithuania 2.01 6.7 8.35
Poland 16.01 63.8 82.5
Slovakia 1.19 11.4 15.24
Slovenia 0.8 3.8 20.83
Bulgaria — 7.46 15.7
Romania — 18.0 21.4
* Data provided by KPMG (EU Funds in Central and Eastern Europe. Progress Report 2007–2013. Retrieved from: https://www.
kpmg.com/SI/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/EU-Funds-in-Central-and-Eastern-Europe.pdf (date of access: May 
12, 2016)) and [35, 36].
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One of the reasons of such a policy on the part of EU was substantial differences between the 
countries and the regional levels of development (Table 2.)
Table 2
GDP per capita (PPP, 1998) in 10 new EU members compared with the average GDP per capita in EU-15 (%)*
Country Country average Richest regions Poorest regions
Czech Republic 65 120 49
Estonia 34 51 22
Hungary 37 55 25
Latvia 26 37 16
Lithuania 29 35 22
Poland 47 70 33
Slovakia 47 105 36
Slovenia 67 84 50
Bulgaria 28 34 25
Romania 32 44 26
* Data provided by [37].
Two decades after the beginning of the reforms, which were aimed, among other things, to smooth 
the differences in the levels of regional development, the West European experts are somewhat baffled 
by their outcome [38]. The main conclusions that follow from the results of processing statistical 
indicators for 190 regions show that the regional differences in Central and Eastern Europe have 
substantially increased over the past two decades and there is a significant polarization in the regional 
productivity and income levels. The authors of the study emphasize the complexity of ongoing 
economic processes when "we have something opposite, the process of regional growth in Central and 
Eastern Europe does not follow the rule of convergence or monotone (neoclassical) bell curve (Kuznets 
regional curve). Most likely, the dynamics of convergence, though present, are significantly exposed to 
the impact of many interrelated causes, especially in the early stage and, afterwards, in the later stages 
of national development with the increasing importance of agglomeration and, particularly, the impact 
of market demand. As a result, despite the process of national catch-up growth, regional evolutions 
are on the whole divergent ..., thus demonstrating an increasing trend of regional polarization in 
these countries." [38]. Based on the results of the study, the authors came to the conclusion that "the 
regional growth is a non-linear process that depends on the level of national development and creates 
divergence and polarization in the later stages of development, despite some individual cases and 
trends towards convergence."
In our opinion, despite the significant expenditure in the form of various regional development 
programs, all post-socialist countries display a clearly dominant national trend of sharp income 
polarization across the society. This trend is evidenced by the results that we obtained by examining 
the production and institutional functions in individual countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
To analyze the impact of inequality on economic growth, we proposed the following model:
( ) ( )( ) ,a b G G n m G GY D K L A+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅= λ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅                                                           (1)
where  Y˜ is the GDP; K is fixed assets; L is the number of those employed in the economy; A is the 
technical progress; G is Gini index; D is the trend operator; g, a, b, n, m are the parameters.
The optimal value of Gini is determined by the following ratio:
1 ln( ) ln( )ˆ .
2 ln( ) ln( )
a K n L A
G
b K m L A
+ ⋅
= -
+ ⋅
                                                              (2)
The optimal trajectory of GDP is determined by the following formula:
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )( ) .a b G G n m G GY D K L A+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅= λ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅                                                           (3)
The calculations based on this model for five countries (Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Latvia) are shown in Fig. 3.
As shown in the Figure, for all countries (except Hungary), the actual Gini coefficient always 
exceeded its optimal value and was continuously increasing.
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As a result, actual values of GDP are lower than those that could have been achieved with optimal 
values of Gini coefficient (Table 3)
Similar calculations that we prepared for the federal districts of the Russian Federation showed 
that the higher level of inequality results in even more substantial economic losses (Table 4 and Fig. 4)
The comparison of results in the two groups of countries reveals that the growing economic 
inequality is a general trend; this inequality slows down the economic growth, while the absolute 
extent of inequality is higher in the CIS.
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Fig. 3. The dynamics of actual and optimal trajectories of Gini coefficient in individual countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe
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3. A "Third Way" of Regional Modernization?
W. Isard, one of the founders of regional economics as a subject of scientific research, noted that 
"the general theory of location and spatial economy provides little in itself to solve specific practical 
problems. Such theory must be supplemented by the applied methods of regional analysis that can be 
used to assess the basic parameters of the spatial economy and each area in the studied system" [39, p. 
17]. A relatively recent monograph published by Chinese scientists [40] emphasizes that the "regional 
modernization is not an analogue of national modernization in miniature. In a country, the regions 
can implement the modernization in different ways, and the process of regional modernization is very 
uneven and can be divided into economic, social and knowledge modernization" [40, p. 105]. The authors 
came to this conclusion by analyzing different scenarios of industrialization and urbanization in 50 
states and 195 counties of the USA. In their analysis of Chinese experience of economic development, 
Table 3
Average excess of optimal GDP over its actual value (%)
Poland 2.4
Hungary 0.4
Romania 2.8
Bulgaria 1.1
Latvia 4.1
Lithuania 2.8
Estonia 1.9
Table 4
The average optimal values of Gini index and the average excess of optimal GDP over its actual value (%) for 
federal districts of the Russian Federation
Federal district Average optimal values of Gini index Average excess of optimal GDP over its actual value (%)
Central 0.352 6.1
North-Western 0.345 3.2
Southern 0.334 5.9
North-Caucasus 0.323 6.3
Volga 0.332 3.5
Ural 0.353 4.7
Siberian 0.356 3.0
Far Eastern 0.332 4.5
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the authors rightly noted the need for "a primary modernization with the industrial era, a secondary 
modernization with the information era, or the knowledge era and the existence of the third state 
called "integrated modernization, which is understood as the coordinated development of primary and 
secondary modernization" [40, p. 8]. When describing the goals of regional modernization in China, 
the authors emphasize the long-term nature of this task with the "following goals for the regional 
modernization of China in the first half of the 21st century: completing the primary modernization 
by 2020; completing the urbanization and modernization and starting full transition to secondary 
modernization in all administrative units by 2040; reaching the level of moderately developed countries 
by 2050" [40, p. 110]. The assessment of the outcome of Russian reform made by Chinese scholars 
in accordance with their index of integrated modernization deserves special attention 4). Professor N. 
Lapshin, who wrote the foreword to the Russian edition rightly noted that "the results of fundamental 
and applied research conducted by the Chinese experts suggest that, in Russia too, it is important 
to distinguish two stages of modernization, including the industrial (primary) and information 
(secondary) modernization, as well as the various phases of their dynamics in the groups of regions 
(constituent subjects of the Russian Federation) that are different in terms of their economic and 
socio-cultural levels" [40, p. 11].
It is even more difficult to assess the state of the economic sphere in Russia. Overall, its index of 
integrated modernization is only 53 %. Within that index, indicators of the service sector have above-
the-average values, including the share of those employed in the sector (83 %) and its share in the 
value added (77 %). However, PPP per capita is very low (36 %) and GNP per capita is catastrophically 
low (16 %). The growth of these indicators requires structural changes in the economy and a qualitative 
increase of the share of remuneration of labor in the value added.
The situation in the area of knowledge efficiency in Russia is very bad (49 % of the standard value). 
On the one hand, it has a 100 % share of students among young people of appropriate ages. On the 
other hand, the index for the share of R&D financing in relation to GDP is only 45 %, the number of 
Internet users per 100 people is 31 %, while the number of residents receiving patents (per 1 million 
people) is 21 %. A positive dynamics of integrated modernization index in Russia is observed in 2000–
2006. During this period, the values of index increased from 54 to 59, that is, by 1 point per year. [40, 
p. 11]
Conclusion
The post-socialist evolution in 1991–2015 was uneven. The new states that emerged following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union went through three types of transformations. First, there were 
transformations on the ideological level. The transformations of the second type were purely economic. 
The third type can be described as institutional (including structural and financial) transformation. The 
region of post-Soviet space was forced to make a transition to a new way of life, new socio-economic 
institutions, new rules of the game. The painful nature of this process was caused by hyperinflation 
and a significant increase in income differentiation. Its key element was the accelerated privatization 
and formation of a new legal and regulatory framework. These transformations created the conditions 
for the inflow of foreign investments and laid the first premises for resuming the economic growth. 
The rise in global energy prices allowed some individual countries to build up their own financial 
power expressed in the increase of foreign exchange reserves. These financial changes contributed to 
economic recovery but, as shown by the current economic environment, the growth was replaced by 
the recession and the prospects of overcoming it look problematic.
The regional aspect of development was virtually ignored across the entire post-Soviet space, and 
the absence of solid and consistent regional policy became a factor of unsustainable development of 
all post-Soviet economies. 
4 The index of integrated modernization for Russia (59 %) ranks it 37th among 131 countries and 16th in the group of 25 moderately 
developed countries, in which it is included. Among the three groups of parameters used to calculate this index based on 12 indicators, Russia 
obtained the highest score for social index (75 %), which is high enough for moderately developed countries. Among its four indicators, the 
health services exceed by 1.6 times the standard value (100 % or more). The share of urban population is close to the standard value (93 % 
of the standard). However, there is substantial lag for the life expectancy (83 %) and catastrophically low environmental efficiency, which is 
measured by the effectiveness of the energy sector, or more specifically, by the ratio of GDP per capita and energy consumption per capita. 
The low level of this ratio (24 %) is the main obstacle to further improvement of the social index in Russia, and the achievement of its 100 % 
value is a long-term task that will require to increase the energy efficiency by several times.
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The analysis of transformations in Eastern Europe during the last quarter of the century shows that 
the results of this transition, especially the social results, did not coincide with initial expectations of a 
significant part of the population. The growing economic inequality, high unemployment, emigration 
as a new social phenomenon — all this is not what people expected at the beginning of reforms. Despite 
significant regional development programs, the gap in living standards with the Western countries 
has not been closed — as in the 1990s, it remains substantial. Moreover, in some countries of Eastern 
Europe, the price paid for the transition to a market economy turned up to be too high.
The uneven pace of reform led to the clusterization of Eastern Europe by creating a European 
"periphery of the periphery." A characteristic feature in the socio-economic evolution of Eastern Europe 
after 1990 was a sharply emphasized process of stratification and social differentiation occurring 
against the backdrop of insufficiently strong middle class and polarization of income levels between 
different regions. Similar processes are also typical of the CIS countries.
The Chinese experience accumulated in the form of some regional modernization measures, such 
as establishing a national government authority for regional development; preparation by the regions 
of their own modernization strategy supported by the real sources of financing; establishing research 
centers for regional modernization; publishing regular reports on regional modernization requires 
further understanding and use in the government practices.
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